US Foreign Policy and Communist China

This is my first ever blog, and being so I thought I would tackle something simple like US Foreign Policy, in this case as pertains to the Peoples Republic of China. Where to begin? To start with, America is essentially an isolationist country that at the same time really wants to help right the wrongs of the world, as long as that doesn’t conflict with our dogma of the moment (read containing Communism here). We are frequently misread by others because of this. As for China, I will assume most know a bit of Chinese history, and how it has come to be today after the 1949 revolution. We somehow “lost” China to the Communists after WWII, and didn’t quite know what to do about it. Well, looking at how we demilitarized immediately after the Japanese surrender in September 1945, it really shouldn’t come as a big surprise.

Japanese aggression is the key. During WWII Churchill and Roosevelt decided that Europe was the bigger threat, and treated the Pacific theater as a close and sometimes distant second cousin to the main effort in Europe. No one had bothered to watch the upstart Japanese first play catch-up, and then in many areas surpass the West in military prowess and design. Or at least notice how they were able to dominate much smaller adversaries, and demand a hand in Pacific Rim foreign affairs, which really just meant attaining their goal of unfettered access to the bountiful raw materials surrounding them. During the war, pretty much all of the former colonies of the former “European Powers” had been overrun by the Japanese, including China, and after the war those powers were now all bankrupt, even with the Marshall Plan in place. To fill the power vacuum, enter the US as the only real arbiter of stability in the Pacific, a job we had to grow into. The Cold War was beginning to heat up, and Communism was The Big Problem, so we really didn’t seriously hunt down the Nazis hiding in plain sight in Europe and South America, because we now needed them to figure out the Red Menace coming from Moscow. The Nuremburg Trials were only partially successful in that regard. In the Pacific, we allowed most of the atrocities conducted by the Japanese to go unpunished, stuff that would make some Nazi nastiness pale in comparison. Read up on Unit 731 for a sprinkling of their creativity. That US Foreign Policy decision, to quickly forgive past “follies” because those involved lived on really useful geography, became the dominant Foreign Policy directive of the Cold War. Contain (Soviet) Communism through any means indeed.

Now back to China. After Mao’s Hordes took over mainland China, the US floundered about for a policy, Europe again being the main effort, this time in the Cold War. At this point, I should briefly discuss Taiwan, and how the remnants of Chaing Kai-shek’s Nationalists escaped to that island and set up shop as a “democracy” (over time they got it right). The US has never really known what to do about them, and neither do I. They are again situated in a most useful geographic location, which helps explain why we always have at least 1 US warship in port at any one time, and a carrier group usually a day or two distant if needed. Mainland China claims them as part of their territory, but so far has not pressed the issue with us. Taiwan is also a great source of deep cover spies into Communist China to try to figure out their mindset, and sell that ability to us in trade, essentially, for protection. Let’s return now to the mainland. We had quite enough of a problem penetrating the Soviets, and the “peasant” version of communism practiced in China just wasn’t sexy enough to be noticed, or certainly understood. Mao took over a decade to solidify his control over the vast territory of China with its conflicting political, social and religious viewpoints constantly at odds. Having been carved up and treated like a colony by the European Powers and Japan, China was now turning inward, avoiding all overt clashes with the West and allowing Moscow to set the tone. One caveat to this, and the only one I know of, was their choice to come to the aid of North Korea when our troops reached the Yalu River bordering their country during our Korean War. MacArthur wanted to go nuclear on them, but Truman said Hell No. I consider their take over of Nepal more of a muscle flexing exercise than anything else. They did it because they could, and the Nepalese couldn’t stop them. Truth be told, the West didn’t really even know where Nepal was, and had no commitments with them. After the Cuban Missile Crisis took the US and Moscow to the brink of a nuclear war, and Vietnam became a self-imposed slogging match between the US and another peasant communist regime, enter Richard Nixon. Nixon had cut his teeth on anti-communism, and at that time lumped all communism into one tidy bundle, as did most of his peers. He did possess a rather keen foreign policy mind, and noticed the fallout between Mao and Khrushchev when K treated M as an altar boy to his obvious Cardinal. M was not amused, and a rather intense border skirmish smoldered for years. Sometimes foreign policy really can be personal. Could the US somehow capitalize on this widening chasm?

The concept of Tripolar Superpowers was born. China had joined the nuclear ranks in the 60’s, with the then aid of the Soviets, but times were now changing. Mao sarcastically thought Khrushchev was wimping out to the US, but then he didn’t have to worry about US nuclear brinkmanship. Through repeated Sino-US ping pong tournaments, the US and Nixon gradually developed a back room rapour with the Chinese that eventually flourished into full-blown discussions. By the Reagan Era, Vice President George Bush the Elder was visiting China, and overtime China agreed to allow top secret listening posts to spy on the main threat to both of us, the Soviets. After we ignored the Tiananmen Square democracy movement, again because our primary foreign policy focus was on containment, and the Chinese weren’t being outwardly belligerent, the Chinese began a more open movement not toward democracy, but toward consumerism, which we liked a great deal. Starting in the 80’s and through the 90’s saw an increasing economic shift from raw materials production (following the old Soviet model) to consumer goods, and their export to a West hungry for cheaper disposable income “stuff”.

Here is how we now find ourselves today. Our domestic policy is now directly linked to out foreign policy. The Chinese Yuan is devalued artificially low, and our soaring federal spending means we want its value raised to thereby lower our dollar value and limit the true cost of our flagrant spending. The Chinese have purchased over time nearly a trillion dollars of US Treasury Securities (our debt) and use that as one hell of a bargaining chip. One lever we hold is that we could simply write that debt off, thus leaving them holding the bag. The rest of the US TS holders would be aghast, but probably go along with it. There is a saying in America- as California goes, so goes the nation. Well, America is the California to the world. And California is in pretty deep doo doo. Militarily we are the only Superpower, and that goes a long way at the bargaining table. But we don’t normally flex our muscles or get into a war until someone attacks us, or one of our friends (Vietnam was that caveat). We could enter into an economic pact with the Russians to counter the Chinese onslaught, but I have visions of the Russians behaving like the Mexicans with NAFTA. The EU has enough problems with absorbing the former Warsaw Pact nations, and paying for Greece’s Summer Olympics hosting. And they like to focus on getting next year’s oil and natural gas quota from the Arabs and the Russians. South America is as isolationist (as a group) as we tell ourselves we are. Their militaries are designed to prevent internal chaos, not threaten an outsider. Their economies are heavily in debt like ours. Africa is for sale to anyone that is willing to pay for its resources. That leaves the Arabs. $10 a gallon for gas, anyone?